Welcome to Wales
This post picks up on the previous one on Making the Case for Materialism. Please see Kairofocus's comments, particularly the one which finishes
So, please, start from Welcome to Wales. I will be happy to wait on you; though I find the artificiality of the length constraint here somewhat less than helpful.
As this post is focussed on KF I am not going to ask for a specific constraint on the length of comments but just make a general plea for conciseness.
Now for my response
I admit I misunderstood this example (not intentionally I assure you).
If I knew that these rocks had fallen into this pattern accidentally then I would not believe the apparent message. This turns on whether the pattern of rocks means anything. Grice famously differentiated between natural and nonnatural meaning. In this case I cannot see a natural meaning of "Welcome to Wales" in the way that for example a rock slide might mean delays ahead. Nonnatural meaning requires someone to have an intention and we are assuming that the rocks were not arranged this way intentionally. The only sense in which they have a meaning is that they happen to fall into a pattern which, when used intentionally, may have a nonnatural meaning.
So in summary - I would not believe them because they don't mean anything.
Obviously I don't find this a problem. So I will be interested to see how you develop your case.
As an irrelevant aside - if I saw the rocks being arranged this way intentionally in North Wales I would still not believe them. The North Welsh notoriously dislike the English.
So, please, start from Welcome to Wales. I will be happy to wait on you; though I find the artificiality of the length constraint here somewhat less than helpful.
As this post is focussed on KF I am not going to ask for a specific constraint on the length of comments but just make a general plea for conciseness.
Now for my response
I admit I misunderstood this example (not intentionally I assure you).
If I knew that these rocks had fallen into this pattern accidentally then I would not believe the apparent message. This turns on whether the pattern of rocks means anything. Grice famously differentiated between natural and nonnatural meaning. In this case I cannot see a natural meaning of "Welcome to Wales" in the way that for example a rock slide might mean delays ahead. Nonnatural meaning requires someone to have an intention and we are assuming that the rocks were not arranged this way intentionally. The only sense in which they have a meaning is that they happen to fall into a pattern which, when used intentionally, may have a nonnatural meaning.
So in summary - I would not believe them because they don't mean anything.
Obviously I don't find this a problem. So I will be interested to see how you develop your case.
As an irrelevant aside - if I saw the rocks being arranged this way intentionally in North Wales I would still not believe them. The North Welsh notoriously dislike the English.
posted by Mark Frank at 2:58 pm
50 Comments:
Mark
You are leaving out crucially material context, in ways that -- perhaps inadvertently (it is quite hard to understand that which is significantly different from and cut sharply across our own view . . . ) -- make up a strawman issue instead of addressing the real one.
That starts with the actual context for the example, and its link: here. (Or even my discussion at no 156, point 3 in the UD thread that has sparked this onward discussion.)
That context is crucial for understanding the issue of what is at stake when we speak tot he claimed causal powers of chance, necessity and agency.
Without these, there can be no reasonable or fair discussion.
I therefore note in hope that there will be a reasonable and substantial discussion, or at any rate; for the record.
GEM of TKI
Amplifying slightly:
In particular, the Welcome to Wales gedankenexperiment highlights:
1 --> the difference between what is logically and physically possible for chance + necessity to do, and what is sufficiently probable on the gamut of our observed cosmos for these to be a reasonable explanation.
2 --> The difference between physical glyphs and/or variations in physical parameters that are often used as signals and the assigned meaningfulness of same; the last being a mental, intelligent act. (Later, through the example of MIMO robot-oriented cybernetic systems per Derek Smith of -- guess where: Wales! (You can't make this up!) -- my online discussion addresses how intelligence speaks to functional systems that tie components in physical causal chains: the ORGANISAITON is crucial and in sufficiently complex systems in our observation is invariably the product of design.)
3 --> The vast, radical difference between physical cause and configuration, and meaningful interpretation, inference or implication.
4 --> And much more, such as the challenge of "lucky noise" to leap from dominant clusters of microstates to the vastly narrower set of functional ones.
Without these contexts there can be no reasonable discussion of what is at stake. So, it would have been far better if you had first described the thought experiment and highlighted what it points to in my estimation, then indicated what in your mind is the reason to reject the chains of inference I derive from it.
GEM of TKI
PS: I appreciate the willingness to accommodate me on length. bu the above is probably not reasonably doable in 200 or so words, which was the context of the remarks I made.
I will put up a summary of the experiment itself, from my online note app 7 as previously linked:
_________
>>. . . suppose you were in a train and saw [outside the window] rocks you believe were pushed there by chance + necessity only, spelling out: WELCOME TO WALES. Would you believe the apparent message, why?
Now, it is obviously highly improbable [per the principles of statistical thermodynamics applied to, say, a pile of rocks falling down a hill and scattering to form randomly distributed patterns]. But, it is plainly logically and physically possible for this to happen.
So, what would follow from -- per thought experiment -- actually having "good reason" to believe that this is so?
1 --> We know, immediately, that chance + necessity, acting on a pile of rocks on a hillside, can make them roll down the hillside and take up an arbitrary conformation. There thus is no in-principle reason to reject them taking up the shape: "WELCOME TO WALES" any more than any other configuration. Especially if, say, by extremely good luck we have seen the rocks fall and take up this shape for ourselves. [If that ever happens to you, though, change your travel plans and head straight for Las Vegas before your "hot streak" runs out!]
2 --> Now, while you are packing for Vegas, let's think a bit: [a] the result of the for- the- sake- of- argument stroke of good luck is an apparent message, which was [b] formed by chance + necessity only acting on matter and energy across space and time. That is, [c] it would be lucky noise at work. Let us observe, also: [d] the shape taken on by the cluster of rocks as they fall and settle is arbitrary, but [e] the meaning assigned to the apparent message is as a result of the imposition of symbolic meaning on certain glyphs that take up particular alphanumerical shapes under certain conventions. That is, it is a mental (and even social) act. One pregnant with the points that [f] language at its best refers accurately to reality, so that [g] we often trust its deliverances once we hold the source credible. [Indeed, in the original form of the example, if one believes that s/he is entering Wales on the strength of seeing such a rock arrangement, s/he would be grossly irrational to also believe the intelligible and aptly functional arrangement of rocks to have been accidental.]>>
_____________
Okay, next my immediate commentary.
GEM of TKI
PS: Every Welshman I have met has been most gracious and polite, even to descendants of the invaders who stole most of their island and drove them into a tiny corner of it . . . [Of course as in part a descendant of Irish, Scottish and African slave ancestors, I know the importance of being welcoming event o those with whom one has historic differences. Including in my case having had a family member hanged unjustly by a British Governor in 1865.)]
My initial analysis:
___________
>>3 --> But, this brings up the key issue of credibility: should we believe the substantial contents of such an apparent message sourced in lucky noise rather than a purposeful arrangement? That is, would it be well-warranted to accept it as -- here, echoing Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1011b -- "saying of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not"? (That is, is such an apparent message credibly a true message?)
4 --> The answer is obvious: no. For, the adjusted example aptly illustrates how cause-effect chains tracing to mechanical necessity and chance circumstances acting on matter and energy are utterly unconnected to the issue of making logically and empirically well-warranted assertions about states of affairs in the world. For a crude but illuminating further instance, neuronal impulses are in volts and are in specific locations in the body; but meaningfulness, codes, algorithms, truth and falsehood, propositions and their entailments simply are not like that. That is, mental concepts and constructs are radically different from physical entities, interactions and signals. So, it is highly questionable (thus needs to be shown not merely assumed or asserted) that such radical differences could or do credibly arise from mere interaction of physical components under only the forces of chance and blind mechanical necessity. For this demonstration, however, we seek in vain: the matter is routinely assumed or asserted away, often by claiming (contrary to the relevant history and philosophical considerations) that science can only properly explain by reference in the end to such ultimately physical-material forces. Anything less is "science-stopping." But in fact, in say a typical real-world cybernetic system, the physical cause-effect chains around a control loop are set up by intelligent, highly skilled designers who take advantage of and manipulate a wide range of natural regularities. As a result, the sensors, feedback, comparator, and forward path signals, codes and linkages between elements in the system are intelligently organised to cause the desired interactions and outcomes of moving observed plant behaviour closer to the targetted path in the teeth of disturbances, drift in component parameters, and noise. And, that intelligent input is not simply reducible to the happenstance of accidental collocations and interactions of physical forces, bodies and materials.
[ . . . . ]
6 --> . . . For instance, once we understand that ions may form and can pack themselves into a crystal, we can see how salts with their distinct physical and chemical properties emerge from atoms like Na and Cl, etc. per natural regularities (and, of course, how the compounds so formed may be destroyed by breaking apart their constituents!). However, the real issue evolutionary materialists face is how to get to mental properties that accurately and intelligibly address and bridge the external world and the inner world of ideas. This, relative to a worldview that accepts only physical components and must therefore arrive at other things by composition of elementary material components and their interactions per the natural regularities and chance processes of our observed cosmos. Now, obviously, if the view is true, it will be possible; but if it is false, then it may overlook other possible elementary constituents of reality and their inner properties. Which is precisely what Liebnitz was getting at [cf point 5 on excerpts from his Monadology, omitted].>>
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Okay, I trust this sets up a reasonable context for serious discussion.
GEM of TKI
PS: pardon my dyslexic typing. mechanical spell-checks do not pick up all cases, and I often see what should be there not what is.
This particular example demonstrates that intention, a mental phenomenon, is vital to giving meaning to symbols such as the rocks. But it does not follow that mental phenomena cannot be reduced to physical phenomena.
To interpret the rocks as meaning something we have to assume that somebody placed them intentionally. But that intention can be reduced to material things such as a propensity to behave in a certain way in a certain context. So it does not present me with a problem as a materialist.
Perhaps you are assuming that the way that the symbols and statements are "about" something is the same as the relationship between a physical brain state which corresponds to a belief and what is believed. But these relationships are entirely different. That is one of the things that is glossed over by using the awkward phrase "aboutness".
Mark:
One key point of the Wales example is that not all that is in principle physically possible is sufficiently probable to be plausible, on the gamut of our observed universe. (In fact, very similar reasoning is foundational to the statistical form of the second law of thermodynamics, and there is a probabilistic threshold of too implausible to be observable on a lab or planetary scale, of about 1 in 10^50.)
So, first, reductive evolutionary materialists need to show that it is credible that -- per whatever mechanisms and materials you accept -- we can credibly get to life, thence intelligence and mind. This, apart from assertions of bare possibility and some just-so stories; is far too often not done. But -- per Wales -- bare physical possibility is plainly not enough!
Even more relevantly, you need to find a credible basis for the general credibility of the mind and its apparently rational deliverances. (Recall the list of prominent self-referentially incoherent cases in point.)
"Wales" shows here that -- per bare possibility -- chance + necessity can give rise to configurations of matter that -- per accident of outcome -- accord with meaningful codes, but such "lucky noise" has no mechanism for generating logical connexions of the types we need for warrant. Indeed, a very effective way to generate a random outcome in a contingency space is to cause two or more uncorrelated causal chains to collide in an uncontrolled way, giving rise to effectively undirected contingency. (Cf how dice are used to generate effectively random numbers. Or, how older statisticians used to use phone books to generate random numbers from the very deterministic process of assigning phone lines!])
An apparent message tracing to such a process plainly has little warrant, if any.
You need to actively show that warrant, not merely assert that it somehow exists as a possibility. (Again, recall the list of prominent cases of self-referential absurdity of evo mat systems.)
GEM of TKI
Now, you also say:
>> . . . intention can be reduced to material things such as a propensity to behave in a certain way in a certain context. So it does not present me with a problem as a materialist. >>
To that, I first point out that -- as noted above -- the Wales case and related ones show that there is no direct evidence that points out that we may easily bridge the gap between physical cause-effect chains and a chain of rational thoughts that start from pe=premises and infer to conclusions per well-warranted logical connexions.
The point of reductive naturalism, as I note in my online remarks is:
>> the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance.
But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].)
Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. >>
And, to rely on lucky noise and/or happenstance, provides no warrant.
That leaves us the "out" favoured by Rib, i.e. the claimed astonishing powers of natural selection . . .
GEM of TKI
Does Natural Selection [NS] solve the problem?
No, for reasons aptly pointed out by Plantinga in an essay that explains and elaborates the following to a degree we may not indulge in this thread so kindly follow the link:
>> . . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false. >>
So, NS does not provide an out, either; for truthfulness of belief is not necessarily correlated with survival enhancing behaviour. (Indeed, even in science, our theories, models etc are reliable per tests, not necessarily or even approximately true.)
GEM of TKI
Now, you also say:
>> Perhaps you are assuming that the way that the symbols and statements are "about" something is the same as the relationship between a physical brain state which corresponds to a belief and what is believed. But these relationships are entirely different. That is one of the things that is glossed over by using the awkward phrase "aboutness". >>
This is a real switcheroo on the issue of intentionality!
Last I checked it was reductive materialists who tried to reduce the intentionality or aboutness we experience and observe in ourselves as a community of intelligent, conscious agents, to [being nothing but or at most supervening on] physico-chemical brain cause-effect processes and signals; per the so-called hard problem of consciousness. And, in so doing, they consistently end up using intentional language to try to escape intentionality. In short, intentionality is an undeniable reality for us as agents, on pain of self-referential incoherence.
Those who start from experienced fact no 1: we are conscious, intentional agents who think -- and sometimes correctly -- about things in the world, see the brain as a key element in a system, but that there has to be more than cybernetic loops and physical cause-effect chains of neurons firing off in sequence per excitations and perhaps chance. or, reason collapses into colliding uncorrelated physical causal chains.
For, that would decisively undermine rationality itself. For reasons Reppert amplifies and adapts from Lewis . . .
GEM of TKI
Finally for now:
This brings us to the relevance of one aspect of the actual Argument From Reason, per Reppert:
>> . . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts. . . . In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But [physical] causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. >>
Thus, unless evo mat thought can bridge the gap between chance + necessity producing contingent but ultimately undirected outcomes that reflect the collision of uncorrelated chains of cause-effect and what is needed for rational thought, it falls into self-referential incoherence.
And, given the eminence of the cases in view of such evolutionary materialistic descent into self-referential incoherence, that is not a simple problem to address, e.g. cf Marx, Freud, Skinner, Lewontin, Dawkins and Crick, just to name a few.
GEM of TKI
PS: Behaviourism's reduction of intentionality to "propensity to behave" is dead -- cf the Cognitive revolution in psychology -- as it simply deliberately ignored our common experience in pursuit of a third person pseudo-objectivist view that simply misses the point of our inner life of the mind. (E.g. A colour-blind person can be expert on the physics and psychology of colour, without having experienced colour as qualia. Indeed, one of my physics profs was: colour blind. Something is very wrong with s system that ignores the most certain fact of all, our conscious experience of ourselves in our world. Cf John Searle on this general topic.)
KF
I am still struggling to get to grips with what you write. There is just so much of it and I cannot possibly respond to it all.
I think your key argument is something on the lines of:
The Welcome to Wales examples shows you cannot create a phenomenom with mental attributes through pure chance and necessity.
Materialism assumes only chance and necessity.
Mental attributes exist.
Therefore materialism is false.
Please correct me if I am wrong.
My answers are:
1) A bunch of rocks are not the kind of thing that can have a mental attribute. Dead things can only acquire attributes such as meaning through their interaction with living things. We are told these particular rocks did not interact with living things in any relevant way.
2) Living things can have mental attributes. But these mental attributes can be reduced to physical elements (in theory). They are an organisation of physical things which arise through evolution.
You seem to want me to provide an account of how these mental attributes arise. That's a tall order as science has not found the answer yet. My objective is only to show that materialism is coherent - not give a detailed account of how it works.
However, I can point to the rest of the living world which includes representatives of many different shades of mental proficiency from bactera through protozoa to invertebrates, mammals, other apes and homo sapiens.
So although we cannot describe the individual stages we can see an example of gradual change from non-mental to mental.
I will tackle a couple of specific objections in other posts.
On the possibility of natural selection leading to the ability to reason correctly.
You quote the Plantinga paper and write:
So, NS does not provide an out, either; for truthfulness of belief is not necessarily correlated with survival enhancing behaviour.
I am familiar with this paper. It appears to depend on the idea that we might evolve false beliefs which combined with appropriate desires are just as adaptive as true beliefs.
But we don’t evolve beliefs. Our beliefs are the result of an interaction between things such as our perceptual system and memory systems (which are largely, but not totally, genetic) and the environment. We are born with few, if any, beliefs. And a creature that was born with an extensive set of “built-in” beliefs would be very inflexible and unlikely to survive unless they were the type of beliefs that made little difference to the reality of survival.
Any perceptual or logical system that systematically created an extensive set of false beliefs that combined with bizarre desires lead to adaptive behaviour would be incredibly fragile because it would depend on lucky coincidence.Take Plantinga’s first example.
Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always
runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he
sees will eat him.
Well let’s hope Paul is lucky enough to decide that the better prospect is not in the direction of the tiger. Sooner or later he is going to run into that better prospect. I would say sooner rather than later.
Finally let’s look at the Reppert quote which I will repeat.
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts. . . .
In the above example brain state A is the belief that all men are mortal. Brain state B is the belief that Socrates is a man. Let’s call brain state C the belief that Socrates is mortal. How do we get from A and B to C?
Well there are lots of ways but one might be that we have learned the syllogism - if all Xs are Ys and A is an X then A is a Y. This is another brain state - call it D.
Because of D, brain states A, B and D cause C. This is all happening in virtue of the content but also at a physical level. D would not have been learned if the rule did not work in reality but it is manifested as a brain state.
Hi KF,
Since you invoked my UD alter ego 'ribczynski' above, allow me to explain why the argument from reason fails as a critique of materialism. My points will undoubtedly overlap with Mark Frank's, as he and I share a similar outlook.
1. The AFR proponent challenges the materialist to explain how reason can be based on what are tendentiously called "irrational" material processes. But the challenge can be reversed: how can reason arise from an immaterial mind? Dualists seem to take this for granted, not realizing that they are assuming it. In fact, there is nothing about dualism -- or even theism -- that guarantees the reliability of reason.
2. We already know that reason and logic can be mapped onto physical processes, which is precisely why computers are possible.
3.Furthermore, we know from computer science that even very simple computers, given sufficient time and storage capacity, are capable of computing anything that is algorithmic.
4. Most (and probably all) of reason is algorithmic and therefore computable. (The only point of contention, as far as I am aware, concerns Gödel-like arguments -- but these are irrelevant to the AFR, which concerns ordinary, fallible human reasoning.)
5. Given points 2-4, we know that reason can be mechanized. The remaining question is whether natural selection can mechanize it.
I'll address that in my next comment.
Mark:
First and foremost, kindly address what I have actually said, not your "summary" of what you think I said. Down that -- I think inadvertently -- red-herring lined road lies the notorious strawman fallacy.
For specific instance, one of the particular foci of the Wales example is precisely that while formally chance + necessity can in principle give rise to any configuration of matter, the problem is that when the relevant target zones are sufficiently isolated in a large enough config space one runs out of search resources, provided no active intelligence is factored into the search. [Cf my discussion over at UD here, yesterday.]
So, That is bleat no 1: you are simply not addressing what I have argued, much less how I have argued. As can be seen from:
>>GEM, 7:29 am Jan 2: One key point of the Wales example is that not all that is in principle physically possible is sufficiently probable to be plausible, on the gamut of our observed universe. (In fact, very similar reasoning is foundational to the statistical form of the second law of thermodynamics, and there is a probabilistic threshold of too implausible to be observable on a lab or planetary scale, of about 1 in 10^50.)
So, first, reductive evolutionary materialists need to show that it is credible that -- per whatever mechanisms and materials you accept -- we can credibly get to life, thence intelligence and mind. This, apart from assertions of bare possibility and some just-so stories; is far too often not done. But -- per Wales -- bare physical possibility is plainly not enough!>>
vs:
>> MF: The Welcome to Wales examples shows you cannot create a phenomenom with mental attributes through pure chance and necessity.>>
Can you not see that you have restated an argument per inference to best explanation tied to empirical and probabilistic considerations similar to those that ground the second law under statistical thermodynamics, as an unwarranted assertion to ground a syllogism?
Until and unless that strawmanisation of what I have said is corrected, no further serious discussion is possible. And this, or the like, has now happened several times, here and at UD.
So, apart from a few footnotes, I stop at this point; pending such correction.
GEM of TKI
KeithS/Rib:
Pardon a few frank words. (Mark, pardon the following, but there are limits to civil discussion.)
As can be shown by inspecting this thread at UD, starting here and here [and comparing the onward linked thread at AntiEvo] you have distorted what I and others have said, have resorted to mockery, to personal abuse and the like and have refused to apologise or correct blatant misrepresentations and falsehoods.
You and your ilk at Anti Evo -- absent acknowledgment of wrong, apology, public correction and amending of ways -- have therefore forfeited the right of civil discussion.
Onlookers: the footnotes on Rib's argument below are simply pointers to why his above remarks on points fail.
GEM of TKI
Mark;
Footnotes:
1 --> Neurones, as I have long noted, are about synapses, ion-flows and electrical currents, and are parts of sensor and cybernetic loops. That is, there is a huge explanatory gap between neural networks in our brains and issues of truth, rational inference and ground-consequent relations. This, you have not bridged, nor -- as you acknowledge -- has current materialism dominated science. That is a huge admission.
2 --> Similarly, the issue is not whether living things can have mental attributes, but on what grounds such attributes per inference to best explanation, are to be understood.
3 --> Further to this, per evolutionary materialism, an account in outline has been offered, one that shows serious problems with self-referential incoherence; in general and in case after concrete, high-profile case. So, unless that system of thought can convincingly solve that problem, it is clearly in gross, even fatal error. And promissory notes and just-so stories are not enough.
4 --> Next, our beliefs and perceptions are not what the environment addresses, but our behaviour. And, even the beliefs of science are provisionally tested and accepted as reasonably reliable as opposed to true. In short, Plantinga is right.
5 --> The fact that bacteria and the like are the largest population on earth should also suffice to show that mental adaptations are neither necessary nor a ground for success and flexibility.
6 --> Similarly, your attempted dissection of the Socrates syllogism is based on not only a just-so story but a failure to address the difference between physical cause-effect bonds [in this case electrical neuronal impulses in mV and mA and concentration gradients] and the world of meaning and meaningful action. It is that gap that evo mat needs to bridge without falling into self=referential incoherence.
GEM of TKI
Re Rib's argument:
Onlookers, I footnote so that you can follow up for yourselves:
a --> It is evolutionary materialists who have for many decades now put up a long list of grand metaphysical stories with claimed scientific warrant, that have essayed to account for, inter alia, the origin and basis of consciousness, mind and reasoning.
b --> So, resort to pejoration over "tendentiousness" in pointing out that such attempts routinely fall into self-referential incoherence in crossing the gap from the physical cause-effect chain to the ground-consequent reasoning of logic, are an ad hominem laced distraction form the issue on the merits: adequately accounting for mind per the only things evo mat permits -- matter-energy, space-time and blind forces of necessity and/or chance.
c --> Now, too, reasoning [a much broader process of actively using our minds to lead towards truth and correct error] and logic [certain principles and systems of analysis of how reasoning works or fails to work; which are partly reducible to propositional calculus and that aspect thus found its way into digital systems such as PCs and cameras] are not equivalent, nor is it the case that they are merely mapped onto physical processes in computers and their algorithms. E.g. analogue computers set up intelligently organised analogous situations to differential equation modelled observed phenomena, and track out the resulting trend lines from initial conditions. (And, pot setting, patching, avoiding ground loops, tuning, time scaling etc are not trivial, merely mechanical exercises . . . indeed, let us note that integration,t eh underlying main process, is not at all an algorithmised procedure in mathematics. A lot of creativity went into those tables of special integrals that we end up looking into and massaging functions to fit. e.g. Anyone has a handy analytical solution to the Gaussian bell-shaped curve?)
d --> Digital ones, carry out mechanical manipulation of symbols per Boolean Algebra based on gates and flip--flops and give rise to outputs wholly mechanically determined by the wiring of their logic units, inputs and internal storage states [data and code], without any reasoning apart from that put in by the engineers and programmers and operators. A LOT of active information, in short. And that is before we get to the hardware design and manufacture! [Care to tell us on the challenges of IC manufacturing technology and how they were solved? I guarantee, not by mere algorithmic processes!]
e --> Cybernetic feedback based control entities [e.g. robots and similar servosystems], similarly, are mechanical cause-effect systems organised by intelligent designers.
f --> In each case, the intelligence is not based in the machine but in the mind behind it. As can be traced out through searches of the appropriate patents and copyright offices.
g --> As to algorithms, such step by step finite problem solving sequences of steps are the result, in our observation, of extremely intelligent creative design. An algortihm is the code-based mechanisation of a problem-solving process, but the design of such is a matter of high order intelligence, and per experience and analysis is credibly beyond the reach of chance and necessity on the gamut of our observed comsos. [How soon do you think we run past 500 - 1,000 bits of info storage, and how much chance based perturbation do you think an algor can take before failing? I assure you debugging and associated hardware troubleshooting are not done by chance!]
h --> So, to start from the algorithm is to commit a gross, question-begging non-sequitur: it is the pre-algorithmic process and the extra-algorithmic intelligent action that are crucial.
i --> Human reasoning in its key, creative aspects is precisely non-algorithmic. Indeed we can tell just how hard it is to straight-jacket into algorithmic patterns by trying to teach someone struggling with long division to understand and correctly carry out that common algorithm.
j --> Notice the characteristic intuitive struggle to UNDERSTAND (an act of mind), not just to memorise and carry out mechanical symbol manipulation (which any mere calculator can carry out for faster and far more efficiently than we can; entirely through mechanical processes that are based on syntax not semantics: symbols and manipulation of this symbol in that context per that externally intelligently designed procedure, as opposed to meaningful understanding and inference).
k --> So the notion that "Most (and probably all) of reason is algorithmic and therefore computable" is simply grossly question-begging and in major respects provably false.
l --> So, "Given points 2-4, we know that reason can be mechanized" has no good warrant.
In short, Rib's arguments, onlookers,a re premised on a gross strawmanisation of the issue at stake. And, that joined to ad hominem elements.
Rib (as you obviously will also read this): I repeat: an apology and associated amending of ways are in order and long since overdue.
GEM of TKI
First and foremost, kindly address what I have actually said, not your "summary" of what you think I said.
KF
I do try hard to address at least some of what you say. But there is so much of it and it is very hard to understand what you mean. I have no problem with Plantinga, or Reppert - so it is not that I do not understand the AFR.
Paragraphs such as:
One key point of the Wales example is that not all that is in principle physically possible is sufficiently probable to be plausible, on the gamut of our observed universe. (In fact, very similar reasoning is foundational to the statistical form of the second law of thermodynamics, and there is a probabilistic threshold of too implausible to be observable on a lab or planetary scale, of about 1 in 10^50.)
So, first, reductive evolutionary materialists need to show that it is credible that -- per whatever mechanisms and materials you accept -- we can credibly get to life, thence intelligence and mind. This, apart from assertions of bare possibility and some just-so stories; is far too often not done. But -- per Wales -- bare physical possibility is plainly not enough
Are not clear.
I summarise it for two reasons:
* To check my understanding.
* To try and identify which are the key points in this sea of words. For example, I guess the whole business of the second law of thermodynamics is not key and does not need to be addressed.
Clearly I failed in both. But it was done in good faith. I cannot just launch into trying to address all the thousands of words you have written.
Maybe you can help?
Perhaps by identifying the four or five key things you wish to assert. Make each assertion a single sentence (with a simple structure) using the minimum of specialist abstract words, then support it with a single concrete example.
KF
I hope you will be able to make a succinct statement of your case as I suggest. The other thing I want to do is check what kind of response you are looking for. Maybe I can never satisfy you!
I believe there are three key questions in the AFR. One is:
1. How can reasoning take place using only physical things such as neurons?
2. How did reasoning based on physical things come into being?
3. If our reasoning is based only on physical things such as neurons, how do we know it is sound?
I will just consider 1 and 2. I will leave 3 for a later comment.
Clearly we don’t yet know the answer to either 1 or 2 in detail. Science simply hasn’t got that far. All that is possible is to show that the questions can be answered in principle. So all I can offer is things such as:
refutations of arguments that try to show that 1 and 2 are impossible
hypothetical cases showing how 1 and 2 might be answered
comparisons with other situations e.g. computers, other living things which show some level of mental ability
You can call these “just so stories” if you like but that is all that is available given the current state of science. If this type of response is not adequate then perhaps we should stop now.
Apologies to Mark, can I also be Frank ( :) ), off-topic but I can't let this remark from Mr. M. pass without challenge. The UD thread at AtBC owes its very existence to the disgraceful moderating policies first established by Dembski and developed by others since.
Mr. M:
As can be shown by inspecting this thread at UD, starting here and here [and comparing the onward linked thread at AntiEvo] you have distorted what I and others have said, have resorted to mockery, to personal abuse and the like and have refused to apologise or correct blatant misrepresentations and falsehoods.
People who have been banned do not have the opportunity to support or expand on claimed misrepresentations or falsehoods. You, on the other hand, are able to claim you have defeated their arguments by their lack of response. This is one reason people have little or no respect for the remaining UD posters.
Mr. M:
You and your ilk at Anti Evo -- absent acknowledgment of wrong, apology, public correction and amending of ways -- have therefore forfeited the right of civil discussion.
You, sadly, have the right to express your views, however obscurely and at what length you choose, with as many references to Plato's cave as seems appropriate to you. Keiths has the right to express his clear, concise and cogently argued views in whatever venue is open to him. Expressing a view publically exposes you to the possibility of refutation and ridicule. There are simple solutions if you find this a problem.
Mr. M:
Onlookers: the footnotes on Rib's argument below are simply pointers to why his above remarks on points fail.
Here is one particular onlooker who will be making his own assessment of whose argument fails. May I add that Mark and Keith are two of the politest and most patient internet posters I know and you ought to be flattered that they are prepared to give you the time of day.
By the way, Mr. M, is your visceral dislike of Darwinian explanations in any way connected to the suggestion of a link to eugenics and the consequences of such as a state policy? Your widely expressed views on slavery seem to suggest this.
Alan
Thanks for your comment. As a matte of interest why do you refer to MF as Mr. M? Did I miss something?
Hi Mark,
GEM are Kairosfocus' initials, and I did not want to be presumptuous in addressing him as G.
Hi Alan,
Thank you for that trenchant comment. Isn't it interesting how KF, who casually dismisses his fellow ID supporters for their "manifest want of capacity", becomes so prickly when his own ego is threatened?
KF, I note your uncharacteristic silence regarding the double standards at UD. Do you realize that by your own criterion, that means that you concede the argument?
Regarding your copious "footnotes" to my argument, I note first of all that you haven't responded to my reciprocal challenge:
But the challenge can be reversed: how can reason arise from an immaterial mind? Dualists seem to take this for granted, not realizing that they are assuming it. In fact, there is nothing about dualism -- or even theism -- that guarantees the reliability of reason.
Your "footnotes" boil down to a disputation of my claim that most (if not all) reasoning is fundamentally algorithmic. Yet the only counterexample you offer is bogus. The fact that a particular integral doesn't have a closed-form analytic solution does not mean that it can't be computed algorithmically. You've conflated the two concepts.
The challenges remain: Show us how a dualist can justify the reliability of reason, and give us an example that shows that reason is not ultimately algorithmic.
Footnotes:
A few remarks on personalities and the like are unfortunately in order. Pardon, Mark.
I comment briefly:
1 --> FYI, I have commented publicly and privately on points where UD's moderation policy has in my opinion gone too far, prof PO being a key case in point; and for that matter when the blog has gone for the use of improper language etc.. (In short the above is on a strawman mischaracterisation.)
2 --> But there are also points where the issue of incivility is a very relevant criterion and you Rib have plainly gone beyond that point. For instance refusal to correct mischaracterisations of people, facts and arguments joined to mockery, is beyond that level, as is manifestly so in the cases I have linked. AE has some serious homework to do. And in fact it is that sort of unfortunately common misbehaviour that is the foundation of the strength of the moderation policy that formerly obtained at UD.
3 --> As to the case of Rib's third or so exclusion, calling someone a hypocrite -- what "smarmy" means -- and the like without good justification is plainly improper and was in context utterly uncalled for. Similarly, you have dismissively attributed to a blog commenter what is a concept pioneered by Orgel, Yockey and Wickens et al. And, even MF's use of "vitriol" in the relevant thread, was over the top by a long shot. To his credit, and that is in large part why I decided to discuss anything with him in his own blog, he expressed regrets for having been overly sensitive. [AE folks, you will see that I have pointedly refused to have anything to do with your forum.)
4 --> In the ID movement there is indeed a need for capacity development. (On the ID science side, this is a perennial challenge due in very large part to the "expelled" phenomenon [a phenomenon that frankly borders on PC tyranny in too many cases over too many years], as well. But that is at a different level.)
I turn to substance in a moment, as a part of my footnotes.
GEM of TKI
Footnotes:
A few remarks on personalities and the like are unfortunately in order. Pardon, Mark.
I comment briefly:
1 --> FYI, I have commented publicly and privately on points where UD's moderation policy has in my opinion gone too far, prof PO being a key case in point; and for that matter when the blog has gone for the use of improper language etc.. (In short the above is on a strawman mischaracterisation.)
2 --> But there are also points where the issue of incivility is a very relevant criterion and you Rib have plainly gone beyond that point. For instance refusal to correct mischaracterisations of people, facts and arguments joined to mockery, is beyond that level, as is manifestly so in the cases I have linked. AE has some serious homework to do. And in fact it is that sort of unfortunately common misbehaviour that is the foundation of the strength of the moderation policy that formerly obtained at UD.
3 --> As to the case of Rib's third or so exclusion, calling someone a hypocrite -- what "smarmy" means -- and the like without good justification is plainly improper and was in context utterly uncalled for. Similarly, you have dismissively attributed to a blog commenter what is a concept pioneered by Orgel, Yockey and Wickens et al. And, even MF's use of "vitriol" in the relevant thread, was over the top by a long shot. To his credit, and that is in large part why I decided to discuss anything with him in his own blog, he expressed regrets for having been overly sensitive. [AE folks, you will see that I have pointedly refused to have anything to do with your forum.)
4 --> In the ID movement there is indeed a need for capacity development. (On the ID science side, this is a perennial challenge due in very large part to the "expelled" phenomenon [a phenomenon that frankly borders on PC tyranny in too many cases over too many years], as well. But that is at a different level.)
I turn to substance in a moment, as a part of my footnotes.
GEM of TKI
Continuing:
On substantial points:
5 --> Mark, I have shown above a case where what you respond to and your summary are quite divergent. Admittedly, Stat thermo-D and the like are not common garden variety subjects of study, but the named instance is reasonably accessible in its fundamentals [cf. here Hoyle's 747 in a junkyard example], and the thinking involved is also foundational to a whole lot of inferential statistics. And I think the Wales example captures some of the flavour at least of the issue, on a familiar scale.
6 --> Beyond a certain point, also we move beyond being simple to being simplistic, and tending to fall into strawman arguments. I have tried to be reasonably simple and summary above without doing that.
7 --> But when I have found a case where I start by EXPLICITLY discussing the difference between [a] what is logically and physically possible and [b] what is plausible on chance conditions, per available search resources in the context of an inference to best explanation argument, and that crucial point is suppressed in the intended summary, that is a material point that is being missed. (Indeed, it is the heart of the issue on the EF. If one cannot "get" that distinction, unfortunately, one is in no position to evaluate the merits of the basic ID argument. And, that is part of why I developed the form of the Wales example I used.)
I hope that we can at least start there and clarify the core issue. [Which BTW, is why I said let us start there. I am not satisfied that one can discuss say AFR with profit in a context where Wales is not being clearly addressed, as it underscores inter alia the distinction between physical cause-effect chains and intentional, meaningful mental acts in a context of reasoning and knowledge.]
GEM of TKI
onward:
8 --> Mark, on AFR, first I note that our first fact of intelligent existence is that we are conscious, intentional reasoning agents who experience qualia and who at least sometimes credibly learn and know truths about the world and about reasoning. And, that theories are accountable to the facts.
9 --> In that context, you need to draw a careful distinction between (a) influence and involvement of objects in a process, and (b) either necessary or sufficient physical causal involvement.
10 --> Brains, sense organs such as eyes and ears, expressive ones such as tongues or fingers, and the like are a part of our experienced embodied rationality, but we have no good reasons to infer that they are either causally necessary to or sufficient for rationality. In short, we have open worldview questions here.
11 --> In that context, we can show that -- e.g. through the Wales example -- physical cause-effect chains rooted in chance and necessity may (with significant search resources hurdles) in principle get so far as an apparent message, but will run into a categorical wall when we need to transfer to the world of logical ground-consequent and best explanation modelling/ reasoning etc.
12 --> That is a clue that there is a factual inadequacy at work on materialist attempted accounts of mind and its origin and credibility. That is further underscored by the consistent pattern of incoherence and even self-referential absurdities that come out across time in even the very high profile examples of evolutionary materialist thought. And, in that context, the AFR family of arguments underscores the general reason for that observed pattern.
13 --> So, by contrast with your follow-up assertions on your Qs 1 - 2, the evidence is that the physicalist account of reasoning and knowledge fails to account for fact no 1, in actual cases and in general. And the pattern of incoherence and conceptual gaps between physical and logical matters suggest that the failure is not merely that materialist science has not got far enough along yet.
14 --> Computers do not show mental ability at all. They are machines programmed by intelligences and manifest lockstep cause effect chains that notoriously do exactly what you tell them to, even if it makes no sense: GIGO. In short the intelligence is in the organisation of the hardware and the software, which are artifacts of intelligent design.
So, the just so stories and promissory notes are not at all all that we have at this point.
GEM of TKI
Moreover
15 --> I note from KS: how can reason arise from an immaterial mind? Dualists seem to take this for granted, not realizing that they are assuming it. In fact, there is nothing about dualism -- or even theism -- that guarantees the reliability of reason.
16 --> This has got the issue of fact and explanation back-ways around. For, our first level of empirical experience is that we are conscious, intelligent creatures who -- though error-prone -- do act mentally into the world, and sometimes to the good and the sound. No worldview that cannot account for that fact no 1 is credible. Commonplace facts, sirs are not mere assumptions or assertions; nor are those self-evident truths that are the premise of our rationality: one rejects or disputes such on pain of self-referential absurdity and the like. (And of course that is where evolutionary materialist systems of thought notoriously run into trouble.)
17 --> In sum, the evidence is that we do reason and know, however imperfectly. The further evidence is that physical cause-effect chains tracing to chance + necessity at work on matter-energy in space-time are inadequate to account for that.
18 --> But by taking the basic facts of our experience as a lodestar, we can see that if wee accept that mind is real, can influence our bodies and our world, and often leaves behind signs that point to its action beyond what is credible for chance and necessity alone, we can then take a fresh look at the world around us. (Chesterton's discussion of the cave paintings in France is an amusing example of such a fresh look: we must not blind ourselves to the artistry of mind at work, even among our remote ancestors!)
19 --> From that we then see that mind is credibly involved in the origin of life and body plan level biodiversity. Also, the fintetuned and sophisticated balance of the physics that underlies our observed physical cosmos. So, there is reason to at least consider that matter as we experience it may be the product of mind, not the other way around. And on such a view, that mind should interact with but transcends the limitations of matter is not unreasonable. (There is even hope that we as minds may one day be able to find a way to create artificial minds.)
20 --> Is most reasoning mere implementation of algorithms? the evidence, sirs, is that algorithms are the product of minds that go far beyond the mechanical cause-effect chains that one has to spend so much time debugging to get to work. [I wont even bother to discuss how many examples I cited of the gap between mind and algorithm, beyond again pointing to the first serious algorithm that we encounter: long division, and underscoring the struggle we face to gearshift from making sense of it to implementing it as a mechanical process. mind vs mechanism. In short,t he strawman game begins again, even in the presence to the direct contrary evidence.)
___________
Enough has been said that the merits can with profit be addressed.
GEM of TKI
PS: Mark. Sorry on the double post. Net access headaches. Don't know if that is due tot he traffic surge that would have accompanied the events with our volcano over the past day or so.
KF
I give up. I am sorry but I find your writing almost unintelligible. I can understand Dembski, Plantinga and Reppert. I was brought up on reading Kant and Wittgenstein. But try as I might, I continue to flounder when I read your comments.
Passages such as:
“what is plausible on chance conditions, per available search resources in the context of an inference to best explanation argument,”
Or
“physical cause-effect chains rooted in chance and necessity may (with significant search resources hurdles) in principle get so far as an apparent message, but will run into a categorical wall when we need to transfer to the world of logical ground-consequent and best explanation modelling/ reasoning etc.”
Make me want to go and read The Critique of Pure Reason for light relief.
I am going to stop this debate. I can never see it moving beyond the point where I am trying to clarify what you are saying. Thanks for all the time and effort you have clearly put into this and I am sorry it is wasted.
Mark
KF,
Regarding #15 and #16: You must be joking. You're claiming that it's legitimate for you to ask the question of the materialist, but not for the materialist to ask it right back at you. How convenient.
That's a blatant double standard, and you know it.
If you can't answer the challenge, then admit it. Your evasions are transparent.
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
Mark Frank and Cedric,
I know. Kairosfocus is a windbag of the first order. I have tried to point this out to him but he has responded with more windbaggery. I once posted a parody of Kf on Uncommon Descent and was banned from there soon after. Ah well. I believe he really thinks of himself as an intellectual, one who -- given the enormous size and self-referentiality of his writings -- has solved all philosophical and scientific problems in a way congenial to him. You can take any issue and put it through the kairosfocus cuisinart, and it will come out sounding the same.
From Kairosfocus' own blog, I note he has an M. Sc. in physics. As his own name, is clearly stated, by himself, on his own blog, I wonder why he has occasionally complained when being so addressed. Especially as there is so much material under that name in the blogosphere.
Sorry, starts at comment 95. I didn't check where it finishes.
@ Keiths
Trenchant, eh? Flatterer!
Oops, sorry! Messed up original link.
Kairosfocus' own blog
Everyone
I would like this to be a blog where ID supporters feel welcome and free to post. I am not going to introduce any rigorous comments policy but I think it would be good to cut out the personal stuff (I recognise I have been slightly guilty myself).
Thanks
Mark, Read and understood. You make a good point.
Mark:
On names.
I took a couple of days off to see how this thread would develop.
I see that someone has decided that they have a right to use my personal name without permission. FYI sir, I retain my name in a known low traffic corner of the 'net, for reasons of accountability. however, on more high traffic corners, I have used a more opaque reference as that reduces incidence of spammign and the like. [No, it is not because I fear retaliatory expulsion, which is one reason why ID supporters use pseudonyms. MARK, THE USE OF PERSONAL NAMES OF ID'ERS IS A KNOWN MEANS OF ATTACKING THEM, BY PROVOKING INSTITUTIONAL RETALIATION. I ask you to remove the references that could cause me problems.)
Personally tinged complaints on style and the like, I will by and large ignore.
I will comment on a few substantial points below,
GEM of TKI
Mark
There are a few points of substance, which I will respond to. Pardon that I will make a single post by numbered points instead of jumping through the sight-word hoop several times.
On points:
1] Re KS/Rib's claim: The burden of proof on mind
Materialists essay that they can explain the credibility of mind per matter in motion. As shown and linked, this invariably lands them in self-referential incoherence, so they have a problem. [Note onlookers, how no-one took me up on the list of six prominent cases in point over the past 150 years or so. Guess why.]
Other thinkers start from the observed and experienced empirical fact of mind -- the central fact of our experience BTW -- and reason from there outwards, empirically.
That leads us to the conclusion that the best explanation for that is that there is more than matter at work, without contradiction or question begging assumption. that is in part the meaning of the Welcome to Wales example. Here is Taylor on it:
>> just as it is possible for a collection of stones to present a novel and interesting arrangement on the side of a hill . . . so it is possible for our such things as our own organs of sense [and faculties of cognition etc.] to be the accidental and unintended results, over ages of time, of perfectly impersonal, non-purposeful forces. In fact, ever so many biologists believe that this is precisely what has happened . . . . [But] [w]e suppose, without even thinking about it, that they [our sense organs etc] reveal to us things that have nothing to do with themselves, their structures or their origins . . . . [However] [i]t would be irrational for one to say both that his sensory and cognitive faculties had a natural, non-purposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth with respect to something other than themselves . . . [For, if] we do assume that they are guides to some truths having nothing to do with themselves, then it is difficult to see how we can, consistently with that supposition [and, e.g. by comparison with the case of the stones on a hillside], believe them to have arisen by accident, or by the ordinary workings of purposeless forces, even over ages of time. [Metaphysics, 2nd Edn, (Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp 115 - 119.] >>
Materialists may not like that contrast, but it is real enough, and has impact on comparative difficulties.
2] MF: A conceptual issue
You raise the issue that you cannot make out what some things I have said mean, e.g. >> “what is plausible on chance conditions, per available search resources in the context of an inference to best explanation argument,” >>
--> inference to best explanation, is a term for abductive reasoning, that seeks to explain facts by raising alternative explanatory models and comparing on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory elegance
--> As such it is the general context for scientific and worldview level explanations
--> available search resources raises the point that a random walk type search takes up time, space, energy etc to carry out. Only so many search iterations are feasible on the gamut of the planet earth across its lifespan, or our lifetimes, or the observed universe.
--> if such resources allow for at most 10^150 instances [an estimate for the number of quantum states of the observed cosmos across its lifespan], then if something is significantly less probable than 1 in 10^150, it is not within the credible reach of the search resources.
--> This is the Dembski Universal Probability bound. I think Borel, reasoning on earth scale investigations, suggested a much lower limit for a practical zero on odds: 1 in 10^50. (This is what GP refers to in another thread.)
3 ] "apparent messages"
This is one point of the Wales example: an avalanche may in principle -- but running up against very steep odds indeed -- give us a set of glyphs that we interpret as meaningful, but they have not in themselves done anything to anchor the glyphs to logic or empirical warrant.
So, the truthfulness or credibility of such a set of glyphs does not reside int eh power of the chance + necessity based driving process.
This still holds even when we extend the process considerably through OOL and RV + NS leading to socio-cultural evolution and arriving at us discussing over the net.
For, on materialist grounds:
>> . . . [evolutionary] materialism [a worldview that often likes to wear the mantle of "science"] . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance.
But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].)
Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity . . . >>
4] Hermagoras
Not a substantial point, but so in need of response that I remark on it.
He well knows that I have pointed out explicitly at UD the problem, which by his own confession he contributed to.
As one who has participated at UD, he further well knows that ID supporters "outed" can suffer damaging consequences.
That goes to an issue in breach of duties of care -- while of course safely protected behind anonymity!
For shame!
G'day
GEM of TKI
KF
I couldn't find a comment with your name. In fact I don't know what your name is. However, I have removed the comment which I think has part of your name with the rest in asterisks. I am sure the author won't object.
Is that the comment you were referring to?
I am sorry that I am not responding to your other comments. I found the last debate with you such hard work for so little progress I haven't the energy to start another one.
KF, I have had nothing to do with mentioning or alluding to your name here, so I have nothing to be ashamed of. If memory serves, I believe I apologized for once mentioning your name in another forum, and I believe also that you accepted my apology. So kindly get over yourself.
KF,
Your lengthy reply doesn't address my challenge.
The materialist, like the dualist, has the first person experience of mind. Each has to assume the reliability of reason in order to make his argument. Each faces the challenge of justifying the reliability of reason within his worldview.
The materialist has a response to that challenge. Why don't you?
I see that someone has decided that they have a right to use my personal name without permission.
I linked to your own blog, and the further link was one you gave. If you do not want information made public, then I suggest you do not publish it.
My reason for quoting your link was to illustrate how your posting style has been received in other venues.
Mr Fox
Pardon a direct response.
I must suggest you take the courtesy to respect the privacy of others, when they choose for whatever reason to use a handle instead of a personal name, especially in a context like this; and (aside form extreme cases of abusive remarks) whenever they choose to not give a direct link to their own web presence.
ESPECIALLY in this context, where the side you seem to support is associated with academic persecution.
I further suggest that a focus on substance instead of personalities will help move the discussion forward. [And in so doing I note that [1] the incidents in question were those of an after the fact change of policy, for which I hosted the other person IMO improperly excluded, i.e. GP, and [2] the issue on helping to address want of capacity [derisory comments by one individual notwithstanding] is amply answered by just who it is that in the end recently answered MF's challenge to use the Dembski metric on his card shuffling case study.
GEM of TKI
PS: Mark, pardon my having had to speak so directly as above. butt he damaging impact of personalities on fruitful dialogue should be plain.
PPS: Re Ks/Rib: I have pointed out in summary why those of us who start from the fact of personality and its associated aspects instead of the assumption that all reduces to matter-energy and blind interactions thereof, do not face the factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory inadequacy that evolutionary materialism does. In short, the attempt to turnabout the burden of proof fails. We should not let such a distractive debate tactic shift our focus from the central, set matter at stake here: evolutionary materialism cannot account for fact no 1: that we are conscious creatures with minds that we must rely on, without consistently falling into self referential incoherence.
KF,
Earlier in the thread, you stated:
For, our first level of empirical experience is that we are conscious, intelligent creatures who -- though error-prone -- do act mentally into the world, and sometimes to the good and the sound. No worldview that cannot account for that fact no 1 is credible. [Emphasis mine]
I've pointed out that dualism cannot account for that fact. You have also been unable to supply such an account.
By your own criterion, then, we should reject dualism as incredible.
Hoist by your own petard, eh?
Mr M writes:
Mr Fox
Pardon a direct response.
Not at all. I am sure everyone would welcome some plain speaking.
I must suggest you take the courtesy to respect the privacy of others, when they choose for whatever reason to use a handle instead of a personal name, especially in a context like this; and (aside form extreme cases of abusive remarks) whenever they choose to not give a direct link to their own web presence.
As I said, when you choose to enter the public domain, with a published website, or when you choose to comment elsewhere, you open yourself to scrutiny and comment. This is a fact of life. If you wish people not to know your name, then don’t publish it, just use a pseudonym. Many others manage.
ESPECIALLY in this context, where the side you seem to support is associated with academic persecution.
My criticisms in this context are to do with your presentation and style. The content of your posts is well-nigh inscrutable to me. I think the whole “academic persecution” issue is a massive red herring, that has done nothing to advance the ID movement.
I further suggest that a focus on substance instead of personalities will help move the discussion forward.
I would love to see some substance. For example, a clear definition of “intelligent”, a clear definition of “design”, a clear definition of “irreducible complexity”, a clear definition of “complex specified information” including how to measure or calculate it, and (unless Dembski has not abandoned it again), a demonstration of how the “explanatory filter” can be used in a biological context. Everyone suffers from viewpoint bias, and I freely admit to being unconvinced of the current scientific merit of ID. I therefore see no need to justify anything. The onus is on ID supporters to come up with something that is useful or at least makes sense. I have difficulty deciding if particular exponents are themselves convinced that ID is more than the “Emperor’s new clothes” and whether they are gullible emperors or crafty tailors.
[And in so doing I note that [1] the incidents in question were those of an after the fact change of policy, for which I hosted the other person IMO improperly excluded, i.e. GP, and [2] the issue on helping to address want of capacity [derisory comments by one individual notwithstanding] is amply answered by just who it is that in the end recently answered MF's challenge to use the Dembski metric on his card shuffling case study.
Clarity, Mr M., strive for clarity. That the challenge has been answered is far from clear.
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